This paper estimates the impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) on capital accumulation, and output and total factor productivity (TFP) growth in the recipient economy. Time series and panel data evidence are provided for a sample of OECD and non-OECD countries in the period 1970±90. Although FDI is expected to boost long-run growth in the recipient economy via technological upgrading and knowledge spillovers, it is shown that the extent to which FDI is growth-enhancing depends on the degree of complementarity and substitution between FDI and domestic investment.
Introduction
Recent developments in growth theory have been primarily theoretical, although signi®cant progress has also been made in growth empirics. The former proposes the endogenisation of technological change, and hence output growth, through mechanisms that prevent the unbounded decline in the marginal productivity of capital in the course of the accumulation process. The latter developments are concerned chie¯y with the estimation of cross-country and time series growth equations, and the methodology used is based on standard growth accounting, pioneered by Solow (1957) and Denison (1962 Denison ( , 1967 .
In general, the search for the keys to economic growth has been arduous in the recent literature, particularly since De Long and Summers ' (1991, 1992) study of the impact of capital equipment accumulation on output growth. Empirical work on cross-country and time series growth has been directed at dealing with two basic problems; namely, the lack of unconditional convergence of growth rates across countries and high estimates of the elasticity of output with respect to capital stocks. Although conventional neo-classical growth in the Solovian tradition predicts that the elasticity of output with respect to capital should be equal to the capital share in output, cross-country estimates point to a much higher value. High capital elasticities can nevertheless be explained on the grounds of simultaneity and omitted variable biases. As for the absence of unconditional convergence, in the sense of Solow±Cass±Koopmans, the problem has been dealt with by the advent of conditional convergence (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992) , once the variables affecting individual countries' steady states have been controlled for.
A recent approach in growth empirics is concerned with estimating growth equations using panel data (Islam, 1995; Blomstrom et al., 1996) , on the grounds that much of the dif®culties encountered in cross-country estimations can be eliminated by correcting for country-speci®c differences in technology, production, institutions, culture, and socio-economic factors, which are expected to evolve through time. Hence, the time series dimension of cross-country growth processes can be acknowledged as much as unobservable cross-country effects that can be deemed to affect growth in the long-run. The problem of autocorrelation in time series analysis and heteroscedasticity in the estimation of cross-section equations can also be minimised (Hsiao, 1986; Matyas and Sevestre, 1996) .
The focus of this paper is on cross-border externality-generating investment and knowledge transfers. The impact of cross-border externalities on growth deserves more careful examination than the traditional closed-economy growth-theoretic approach and international trade models have permitted (Grossman and Helpman, 1991) . Primarily, the impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) on growth is expected to be twofold.
1 First, through capital accumulation in the recipient economy, FDI is expected to be growth-enhancing by encouraging the incorporation of new inputs and foreign technologies in the production function of the recipient economy. Second, through knowledge transfers, FDI is expected to augment the existing stock of knowledge in the recipient economy through labour training and skill acquisition, on the one hand, and through the introduction of alternative management practices and organisational arrangements, on the other. Also, FDI can be expected to promote technological upgrading, and hence diffusion, even without signi®cant physical capital accumulation; in the case of, for instance, start-up, marketing, and licensing agreements; management contracts; and joint ventures in general (de Mello and Sinclair, 1995) . As a result, foreign investors may increase productivity in the recipient economy and FDI can be deemed to be a catalyst for domestic investment and technological progress.
It can also be argued that the absorptive capacity of the host country affects the volume and type of FDI in¯ows. The latter depends on institutional factors, such as the recipient economy's trade regime, legislation, and political stability; and scale factors, such as balance of payments constraints and the size of the domestic market for the goods produced via FDI. The consideration of such (sometimes unobservable) country-speci®c effects, given new FDI-related and existing domestic production possibilities, and their evolution over time, allows for the examination of such FDI-driven cross-country or region-speci®c externalities or spillovers.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 summarises the expected impact of FDI on growth. Section 3 introduces the empirical analysis by focusing on the time series aspects of FDI and growth. Section 4 complements Section 3 by concentrating on cross-sectional evidence provided by panel data estimations. Section 5 provides further discussion on the results presented in the paper and concludes.
The theoretical argument
FDI is conventionally de®ned as a form of international inter-®rm co-operation that involves signi®cant equity stake and effective management decision power in, or ownership control of, foreign enterprises. FDI is also considered to encompass other broader, heterogeneous non-equity forms of co-operation that involve the supply of tangible and intangible assets by a foreign enterprise to a domestic ®rm. Those broader collaborative associations include most types of quasiinvestment arrangements, such as licensing, leasing, and franchising; start-up and international production sharing arrangements; joint ventures with limited foreign equity participation; and broad R&D co-operation.
In the presence of FDI, aggregate production in the recipient economy is carried out by combining labour and physical capital. The latter can be domestic (K d ) or foreign-owned (K w ). FDI affects growth directly, by increasing the stock of physical capital in the recipient economy, as K w is accumulated, and indirectly, by inducing human capital development and promoting technological upgrading. It is also important to evaluate the extent of complementarity and substitution between domestic investment and FDI because a simplistic Schumpeterian view of FDIrelated innovative investment that emphasises creative destruction through substitution may overlook the scope for complementarity between FDI and domestic investment. Under complementarity, innovations embodied in foreign investment may create, rather than reduce, rents accruing to older technologies (Young, 1993) . Also, if FDI is expected to affect growth positively, it may be argued that it requires some degree of complementarity with domestic investment, at least in the short run, given that the existing factor endowments in the host country act as a FDI determinant.
The introduction of FDI in standard Ramsey models yields interesting results. Under constant returns to domestic capital, the condition for saddle pointstability with FDI implies that negative consumption may not be avoided, and hence FDI may be immiserising (Bhagwati, 1973; Brecher and Diaz Alejandro, 1977; Calvo et al., 1996) or dynamically inef®cient.
2 On the other hand, as in the tradition of endogenous growth models, long-run growth can be achieved if the marginal product of capital can be bounded away from the rate of time preference as the stock of FDI increases, and the long-run growth rate depends positively on FDI. Increases in the stock of foreign-owned capital lead to temporary increases in the output growth rate if diminishing returns prevail in the aggregate. However, the FDI-led increase in the growth rate is permanent under constant returns. Long-run growth can also be shown to depend on the degree of complementarity between capital stocks embodying domestic and foreign technologies, and the volume of FDI as a share of GDP. Under linearity, the growth rates of the capital stock and output are constant and equal to the growth rate of (de Mello, 1996) . consumption, and permanent increases in FDI lead to permanent increases in the output growth rate.
3. The time series aspects of FDI and growth
Preliminary considerations
For time series growth equations, empirical work has focused on the dif®culty of lending support to the theoretical prediction that permanent changes in factor accumulation should lead to permanent changes in output (Jones, 1995) , given the linearity hypothesis in a number of endogenous growth models. If growth rates can be increased endogenously, then long-run growth should not in principle admit approximations by processes with a constant mean, unless endogenous growth-enhancing accumulation processes are offsetting. In this respect, time series models provide a preliminary test of the linearity hypothesis, in so far as the greater the accumulation of reproducible inputs, the greater the growth rate of output. In other words, if a country's per capita growth rate exhibits little persistent change over time, so should its determinants, or their persistent movements must be offsetting. If, for instance, FDI generates signi®cant externalities and spillovers in production, as suggested above, FDI-related capital accumulation should lead to an increase in output growth.
As far as empirical validation is concerned, the impact of FDI on capital accumulation, and output and TFP growth is estimated for a sample of 32 countries in the period 1970±90. The Data Appendix provides further details on data sources and de®nitions of the variables used in this paper. We start by testing the hypothesis of stationarity of the output growth and investment rates using the augmented Dickey±Fuller equation below
where g i is the growth rate of i, n and m are chosen according to the Schwartz criterion to produce white noise disturbance terms e i , and i yY kY k w , for
Country selection was primarily governed by the availability of physical capital data in the Summers and Heston data set. It is further based on the stationarity hypothesis, such that countries for which the output growth series are not I(0) by eq. (1) were eliminated from the sample. 3 The countries that satis®ed both criteria were further divided into two groups: OECD and non-OECD countries. The distinction between OECD and non-OECD countries is all the more important here, since the impact of FDI on growth is expected to be stronger in the recipient economy than in the country of origin of FDI. If the advanced economies in the OECD group are the main net exporters of FDI, then the impact should be smaller in those countries than elsewhere. In short, the distinction between OECD and non-OECD countries proxies crudely for the distinction between technological leaders (capital exporters) and followers (capital importers).
However, three points could be raised in this respect. First, there is strong evidence that most FDI occurs across technologically advanced economies (Lucas, 1990) . Second, FDI is very sensitive to balance of payments constraints and factors related to the macroeconomic performance and institutional features of the recipient economy, such as the degree of openness and trade regime, political instability and government intervention, the existence of property rights legislation, and ensuing law enforcement institutions, etc. Finally, the incorporation of new technologies in countries undergoing a process of industrialisation is likely to differ a great deal from that in industrial, technologically advanced economies.
In addition to the augmented Dickey±Fuller test in eq. (1), stationarity can also be assessed by testing for the existence of a deterministic time trend (t) in the series according to the equation below g i t 0 1 t v i t 2 where v i is a white noise term.
In principle, if a country exhibits persistent movements in output growth rates and in capital accumulation (or FDI), then permanent changes in the former can be deemed to result from permanent changes in the latter. This is supportive of the linearity hypothesis, even if permanent changes in output or factor accumulation derive from FDI-related disembodied technological change.
The results of the estimations of eqs (1) and (2) are reported in Tables 1 and 2.   4 Stationarity of the relevant series can also be assessed by inspection of Figs 1 and 2 (FDI series on the secondary vertical axis). In the case of the OECD countries, both FDI and total investment were found to follow a time trend in Italy, Germany, UK, and USA, without a corresponding trend for output growth. For the remaining countries, FDI alone (Australia, Belgium, Finland, Spain, and Sweden) or total investment alone (Austria, Denmark, New Zealand, and Switzerland) seem to follow a time trend without a counterpart in output growth. Hence, for the OECD sample, there is no time series evidence of linear endogenous growth derived from FDI and/or capital accumulation in the period under examination. For the non-OECD countries, in Table 2 , in the case of Ecuador and Ivory Coast, there is a negative time trend in the case of FDI (and capital investment in the latter country) and a negative time trend in output growth. This ®nding is suggestive of a linear endogenous relationship between output growth and FDI. Both FDI and capital investment also appear to follow a time trend in the case of the Dominican Republic, Mexico, and the Philippines, without 4 Ideally, the total capital stock in the economy should be disaggregated into domestic and foreignowned capital, such that the analysis could be carried out for the two types of capital separately. nevertheless a corresponding trend in output growth. In the case of Mexico, the positive trend in FDI may be offsetting the negative trend in capital formation, despite the fact that, in oil-exporting countries, the dynamics of FDI are expected to differ from the case of their non-oil-exporting counterparts. Important explanatory factors for the surge of FDI in¯ows in developing countries in recent years are foreign acquisition of domestic ®rms in reform-driven privatisation 138 foreign direct investment-led growth Notes: Numbers in parentheses are ADF(1) statistics (calculated without a constant or a time trend) and the coef®cient reported is the 1 coef®cient in eq. (1). For the time trends, the numbers in parentheses are t-statistics and the coef®cients reported are the 1 coef®cients in eq. (2). Capital stocks refer to producer capital (durables minus transport). Germany refers to former West Germany only. FDI data for Belgium also includes Luxembourg. In the case of France and Switzerland, there were too few observations in the FDI series for tests to be carried out. In the case of Denmark, the DF statistic is reported instead of ADF(1) for the FDI series. (*) signi®cant at the 5% level, and ({) signi®cant at the 1% level.
programmes, globalisation and internationalisation trends in production, operations and investment, and increased economic and ®nancial integration, among others. The possibility that the variables under examination may be stationary around a trend is also taken into account by including a deterministic time trend in eq. (1), in addition to the drift term. The estimations (not reported but available upon request) show that the results reported in Tables 1 and 2 are robust to the exclusion luiz de mello 139 of these trends in eq. (1), for the vast majority of countries in the sample. 5 The exceptions are Italy, for which the hypothesis of a unit root in the FDI series is accepted when a deterministic trend is incorporated; and Finland, the Dominican Republic, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Kenya, for which unit roots are found in the capital investment series. In the case of The Netherlands, the capital investment series becomes stationary when eq. (1) is estimated with a deterministic trend.
140 foreign direct investment-led growth Tables 1 and 2 was also assessed using additional test statistics, such as the Dickey±Fuller ( ( , ( ( , 9 3 , and 9 2 statistics (see Enders, 1995 , for de®nitions of the test statistics). The results are nevertheless not reported in the paper due to space limitations. 
Further time series evidence
To extend the analysis of the time-series aspects of the growth-FDI nexus, the longrun impact of FDI on capital investment, and output and TFP growth is estimated.
6
The bivariate VAR models were estimated for the countries in Tables 1 and 2 for which the output growth, FDI, and capital accumulation series were found to be I(0). If the relevant variables are found to cointegrate, the impact of growth-enhancing accumulation on output and TFP growth can therefore be deemed to be permanent. The result of the estimations are reported in Tables 3, 4 , and 5.
The objective here is also to test the conjecture put forward above that the growth-FDI nexus involves the impact of FDI on capital accumulation and technological change itself. The former assesses the scope for complementarity or substitutability between capital stocks embodying domestic and more ef®cient FDI-related technologies. The latter assesses the scope for knowledge or technology transfers between foreign investor and the recipient economy.
As for the results of the long-run time series analysis, all countries in Table 3 exhibit a time trend in their FDI series with the exception of Sierra Leone, Venezuela and Bolivia. The long-run FDI coef®cients vary from 0.08 in Venezuela to À0.15 in Ecuador, which provides evidence that FDI can be growth-enhancing or depressing in the long-run. The negative sign of the FDI coef®cient in most non-OECD countries can be attributed in principle to the macroeconomic instability 142 foreign direct investment-led growth Tables 3, 4 , and 5, given that short-run deviations from the long-run equilibrium depend on the transitional dynamics of the growth process. Under linearity, there is no transitional dynamics. As a result, in the presence of FDI in¯ows, output growth in the recipient economy adjusts automatically to its steady-state path.
and severe international credit (and hence balance of payments) constraints that characterised most of the period under examination, particularly the 1980s (Cohen, 1994; van der Ploeg and Tang, 1994) . By Table 4 , FDI has a positive long-run impact on capital accumulation in Panama and Sierra Leone. No cointegration relationship was found for Bolivia and Ecuador. By Table 5 , there is a positive longrun relationship between FDI and TFP growth in Venezuela, and a negative one in Italy.
Panel data evidence

Preliminary considerations
To complement the time series analysis above, we now turn to panel data estimations. This is because it is well known that, in the case of cross-country and time-series estimations, the correlation between the error term and the regressors in standard growth accounting-based, time-series production function luiz de mello 143 Note: As in Table 3 with z TFPY k w .
estimations leads to simultaneity and omitted variables biases. The correlation between the per capita capital stock and the error term leads to capital elasticity estimates that are well above the capital share in output (Young, 1992 (Young, , 1995 . With regard to the high estimates of the capital elasticity coef®cient, they have been interpreted as evidence for the linear endogenous growth model (Romer, 1990) and explained on the grounds that capital should be understood in a broad sense to incorporate additional inputs (for instance, human capital) without diminishing returns (Mankiw et al., 1992) . This line of argument sustains that high capital elasticities incorporate the externalities generated by the use of additional inputs, such as knowledge and human capital accumulation (Benhabib and Jovanovic, 1991; Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994) . In fact, cross-country regressions reveal very little of the role played by policy and institutions (Crafts, 1995) .
In panel data estimations, however, the existence of unobservable growth determinants that are country-speci®c, such as the ones discussed above, can be acknowledged and taken into account in the estimation procedure. This can explain a great deal of the distinct time series patterns in Tables 3, 4 , and 5 on the grounds of country-speci®c effects. The country-speci®c determinants of FDI may provide further insight into ulterior growth determinants that are unobservable in the time series analysis.
Let country-speci®c factors affect primarily TFP, such that, in the presence of FDI, TFP can be decomposed into a country-speci®c term (), and a term incorporating foreign knowledge transfers or technological change embodied in FDI ( " ), which is exogenous to the recipient economy. If different countries are assumed to have the same technology and institutions, then TFP "
. On the other hand, if country-speci®c growth determinants matter, which seems to be a more realistic conjecture, then TFP h h "
, where h is a recipient country index. Countryspeci®c factors may identify what Abramovitz (1986) referred to as a country's social capability'.
Rather than engaging in a growth accounting exercise, the impact of FDI on output and TFP growth, and capital accumulation can be estimated using the following equation
where x yY kY TFP and 4t is an error term. If unobservable country-speci®c growth determinants are to be taken into account, then eq. (A) can be estimated as follows
where 5 hY0 is a time-invariant individual country effect term. Equations (A) and (B) are dynamic panel models, which are estimated by IV, due to the likely correlation between the regressors and the disturbance terms. As for the choice of instruments, the dif®culty lies in the requirement that they should not be country-speci®c but correlated with the regressors. Nevertheless, to reduce the expected sensitivity of the results to the instruments chosen, we take a conservative approach and use the lagged dependent variables as the main instruments, together with current and lagged values of the recipient economy's per capita income as a share of the US per capita income. The latter variable is expected to proxy for the differences in marginal capital productivities, given the differences in capital endowments across countries and the technological gap between technological leaders and followers. The latter also proxies for the scope for technological transfers in FDI. Accounting for such technological gaps, or`idea' gaps in the sense of Romer (1993) , is expected to correct for excessively high elasticities in the case of technological laggards.
The results
By Table 6 , there is a positive impact of FDI on output growth in all panels, with and without country-speci®c terms. The ®nding is suggestive of a dominant complementarity effect between FDI and domestic investment. Contrary to the case of Tables 3 and 5, the ®ndings in Table 6 with respect to output growth are consistent with those for TFP growth, by which FDI appears to have a positive impact on technological change, in the OECD panel. In the non-OECD panel, however, there seems to be a negative relationship between FDI and TFP growth, when group luiz de mello 145 Table 6 Panel data estimations (®xed-effect estimations) Note: Estimations carried out by IV, columns (A) and (B) refer to estimates without and with group dummy variables, respectively. The common intercept in column (A) is not reported. Instruments include the lagged dependent variables and per capita income as a share of the USA per capita income. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. * Includes France and Switzerland, and dummy variables for African and Latin American countries separately.
dummy variables are incorporated in the equation. It can be inferred that in technological followers, FDI reduces TFP growth by fostering producer capital accumulation, given the complementarity effect, although the converse cannot be inferred in the case of technological leaders. Also, by Table 6 , FDI seems to have a positive impact on producer capital accumulation in the broad panel, but not in the OECD (without group dummies) and non-OECD panels. In the latter, however, after the introduction of country effects, the relationship between FDI and capital accumulation becomes positive. The results lend support to the hypothesis of some degree of substitutability between FDI and domestic investment, whereby in more advanced economies, the more ef®cient technologies embodied in FDI may lead to a higher rate of technological obsolescence of the capital stocks embodying older technologies. In the same vein, complementarity seems to prevail in technological laggards. In this respect, it can be argued that the degree of complementarity between old and new technologies found in technological followers, after country-speci®c effects were accounted for, suggests that those economies are either less ef®cient in the use of the new technologies embodied in FDI-related capital accumulation, or that the latter are not much more modern or productive than the ones existing in the recipient economy. Those country-speci®c effects may include, for instance, protectionist trade and investment policies implemented to safeguard indigenous industries from foreign competition, which would distort social and private returns to capital investment and hence the ef®ciency of FDI.
7 Foreign investors can then be deemed to select the technologies embodied in FDI-related capital accumulation depending on the speci®c productive and institutional characteristics of the recipient economy, in which case, FDI may be a less important vehicle for cross-border knowledge transfers than previously thought.
The ®xed-effect estimates above rely on the assumption of homogeneity of the different panel groups for a common slope to be imposed in pooled regressions. The ®xed-effect estimator also reduces biases due to omitted variables, particularly when group dummies are incorporated in the regression (Matyas and Sevestre, 1996) . Nevertheless, in dynamic panels with a large time dimension, ignoring group heterogeneity produces serially correlated disturbances and hence inconsistent parameter estimates (see Pesaran and Smith, 1995 , for further details). The biases in this case tend to overestimate the average shortrun effects and underestimate the average long-run effects in ®xed-effect estimations, and cannot be eliminated by using the IV method or by considering autocorrelation correction. Instead, the average effects in dynamic panels with changing slopes across groups can be consistently estimated using the mean group procedure.
Parameter estimates using the mean group estimator for heterogeneous panels are reported in Table 7 . It is noticeable that the aggregate parameter estimates using the ®xed-effect estimator are fairly similar to the means of the country-speci®c regressions in the case of the OECD sample. In the case of the non-OECD sample, aggregate estimates differ from the average of individual country coef®cients. Although this discrepancy suggests the existence of a heterogeneity-related bias, the ®nding is not surprising, given that heterogeneity is likely to prevail in the latter sample, given the diversity of countries pooled together in the aggregate ®xed-effect estimations. In the full sample, the homogeneity of the OECD countries is likely to have reduced the bias, given that the parameter estimates reported in Tables 6 and  7 are fairly similar.
Discussion and Conclusion
General problems in modern growth empirics offer new challenges to the growth theorist. The problem of simultaneity and omitted variable biases in growth equations has been investigated more thoroughly in recent years, in particular as far as the high estimates of the capital elasticity in cross-country equations are concerned. Nevertheless, the problem of sensitivity of the estimates to the instruments chosen to reduce the simultaneity bias in growth equations has not been addressed to the same degree of depth and deserves more careful analyses in the near future. In fact, the solution to these problems lies in the revision of the whole methodology that permeates growth empirics, which is based on 1960s growth accounting or national accounts-type intertemporal investment equations, such as the ones used in Ramsey-type dynamic optimisation problems. The latter too are sensitive to the assumptions regarding depreciation and savings behaviour. Country-speci®c effects are not commonly accounted for in growth empirics and, as seen above, can play an important role in acknowledging unobservable growth determinants. In addition, attention should be focused on the biases in ®xed-effect luiz de mello 147 estimations of heterogeneous panels with a large time dimension which cannot be reduced or eliminated by using instrumental variables or autocorrelation correction. Whether FDI can be deemed to be a catalyst for output growth, capital accumulation, and technological progress seems to be a less controversial hypothesis in theory than in practice. For most of the countries for which our methodology could be applied, it seems that the growth±FDI nexus is sensitive to country-speci®c factors that are unobservable in time series analysis. The results reported in this paper suggest that, if FDI is growth-enhancing in the long run, via both knowledge transfers and the accumulation of capital stocks embodying newer technologies, then this impact is likely to be lower in technological leaders than laggards (Grossman and Helpman, 1991) . As a result, the impact of FDI on growth seems to depend inversely on the technological gap between leaders and followers, even though there is evidence that the bulk of FDI occurs across technologically advanced economies.
The degree of substitutability between capital stocks embodying old (domestic) and new (FDI-related) technologies seems to be higher in technologically advanced, rather than developing recipient, economies. The rate of technological obsolescence of the capital stock embodying old technologies is possibly increased in technologically advanced economies in the presence of FDI. Alternatively, it can be argued that the degree of complementarity between old and new technologies found in developing economies, after country-speci®c effects were accounted for, suggests that those economies may: (i) be less ef®cient in the use of the new technologies embodied in FDI-related capital accumulation; (ii) have dif®culty to assimilate capital and technology-intensive improvements; or (iii) that the latter are not much more modern or productive than the ones existing in the recipient economy. Foreign investors can then be deemed to select the technologies embodied in FDI-related capital accumulation depending on speci®c productive and institutional characteristics of the recipient economy. In this case, FDI may be a less important vehicle for cross-border knowledge transfers and the elimination of technological gaps between leaders and followers than previously thought.
Country-speci®c factors (institutions, trade regime, political risk, policy, etc.) may have inhibited the elimination of technological gaps between leaders and followers, such that success in technology or knowledge transfers seems to be affected by institutions.
8 When heterogeneity is taken into account, the conclusions are less clear-cut in the case of non-OECD countries, which are more likely to exhibit signi®cant cross-country diversity, than in the case of their more homogeneous OECD counterparts. Romer (1993) for an interesting discussion of the role played by FDI-related knowledge transfers in closing the idea gap between developed and developing countries.
Data Appendix
Output: Summers and Heston gross national income series in the period 1970±90. Per capita GDP as a share of US per capita GDP is also available in the Summers and Heston data set.
Capital Stock: Summers and Heston producer capital series (durables minus transport equipment stocks) in the period 1970±90. In the case of Brazil, the producer capital series is available from Hofman (1992) .
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI): net FDI¯ows (in¯ows minus out¯ows) are available from IMF's Balance of Payments statistics. When disaggregated series are available, gross FDI in¯ows are used. Unfortunately, the availability of FDI data is limited and time series for most countries start in the late 1960s and early 1970s, which prevents the consideration of a longer time span. For most developing countries, data on FDI stocks is not available. When needed, the FDI stock series were constructed using the perpetual inventory method with a constant annual depreciation rate of 10%. Also, it can be argued that the FDI measures available from individual countries' national accounts can only be taken to be a crude proxy for the impact of foreign technologies and spillovers on growth, given that they are ®nancial ows that may capture (or obscure) operations of foreign investors (typically MNCs) in the recipient economy. Also, FDI¯ows are sensitive to cross-country differences in the treatment of re-invested earnings and¯uctuations in intra-®rm transactions. The role of tax havens and offshore banking centres also pose additional measurement complications. However, such¯ow variables are the ones currently available and most widely used in this line of research.
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth measured as the difference between per capita output growth and the per capita capital accumulation, both domestic and foreign-owned.
